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A large gap may lie between the amount of debt  ing to Cohen's calculation, doing so immediately
relief that is nominally granted to a debtor and  raises the price - by as much as 45 percent
that which is actually given up by the creditors.  when half the debt is repurchased.  A favorable
To help put that gap in perspective, Cohen  (small) buy-back price is shown to be (on
proposes a valuation formula that provides:  average) about half the observed market price.
v The price at which a buy-back of the debt,  The value of guarantees, Cohen argues,
on the secondary market, is advantageous to the  cannot exceed 25 percent of the market price of
country.  the debt.  Typically they're worth only about 10
percent.
o  The value to creditors of having the flows of
payment guaranteed against factors that hinder a  As for the degree of tradeoff, Cohen's
country in servicing its debt.  formula finds that a 1 percent additional growth
rate is worth a 15 percent increase in the flows of
= The degree of tradeoff between growth of  payments.
payments and levels of payments.
Cohen also offers an assessment of the
It is not good business for a country to  Mexican debt-relief agreement reached in 1990.
announce its intention to buy back debt.  Accord-
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The work is part of an ongoing research with Richard Portes on the secondary market of
LDC debt.  It was completed while I was visiting the Debt and International Finance
Division, International  Economics Department of the World Bank.I  - INTRODUCTION
The  Brady  plan  has  triggered  a  number  of  proposals  aimed  at
reducing  the  face  value  of  LDC  debt.  As  now  well  understood  in  the
literature  on  this  topic,  there  is  a  gap  which  may  be  very  large  between
the  debt  relief  which  is  nominally  granted  to  (or  purchased  by)  a  debtor
and  the  relief  which  is  actually  given  up  by  the  creditors  (when
measured  in  terms  of  the  net  transfers  which  the  debtor  is  expected  to
pay).
As  indeed  pointed  out  by  Dooley  (1988),  a  country  that  announces  or
that  is  expected  to  repurchase  a  significant  of  Its  debt  on  the
secondary  market  immediately  raises  the  price  at  which  the  transaction
must  be  undertaken  (at  a  level  that  corresponds  to  its  ex-post  value).
One  direct  consequence  of  this  observation  is  that  It  is  certainly
counter-productive  to  set  up  an  institution  or  to  create  a  facility  that
openly  repurcnases  a  given  quantity  of  LDC debt  on  the  secondary  market.
Furthermore,  as  pointed  out  by  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (198P),  even  if  the
country  repurchases  a  small  amount  (or  "ride-up"  the  supply  curve  by
repurchasing  its  debt  one  dollar  after  the  other),  the  price  at  which
the  transaction  is  performed  on  the  secondary  market  corresponds  to  the
average  value  of  the  debt  which  is  (perhaps  well)  above  the  mar&inal
price  that  properly  measures  the  actual  reduction  of  the  burden  of  the
debt  that  is  obtained  by  the  debtor.
In  this  paper,  I  attempt  to  give  some  empirical  flesh  to  these
crucial  (qualitative)  remarks  by  giving  an  exact  valuation  formula  for
LDC debt  which  mimicks,  it  is  hoped,  the  pricing  that  is  obseorved on  the
secondary  market.  Using  some  reasonable  numbers,  I  will  show  that,
following  Doley's  point,  a  country  that  announces  in  advance  that  it
will  seek  to  repurchase  half  of  the  face  value  of  its  debt  may  end-up
over-paying  the  market  value  of  debt  by  about  45  %. Following  Bulow  and
Rogoff's  argument,  I  then  show  that  a  country  (that  is  solvent  in
"average")  may  over-pay  the  buy-back  of  Its  debt  by  a  ratio  of
one  to  two.  I  also  offer  to  estimate  other  transactions  such  as  the
value  of  guaranteeing  against  exogeneous  stock  the  payments  that  are
Imade  by  the  country:  I  will  show  that  such  a  guarantee  Is  not  likely  to
exceed 25 7 of  the market  value of the  debt.
Section  II  offers  a  motivation  and  a  theoretical  background  for
this  paper.  Section  III  gives  the  valuation  formula  and  gives  the
discount  associated  to  various  parameters  of  the  country.  Section  IV
shows  the  difference  between  average  and  marginal  prices  and  estimate
the  value  for  the  country  of  making  a  "take  it  or  leave  it"  offer  to  Its
creditors  ;  section  V  gives  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  guaranteeing  the
debt.  A conclusion  gives  some  perspectives  on  the  Mexican  deal  that  has
been  negotiated  in  July  1989.
11 - MOTIVATION  AND THEORETICAL  BACKGROUND
The  literature  on  sovereign  risk  can  be  compactly  summarized  as  in
the  following  model.  Take  a  two-period  model  and  assume  that  a  country
has  to  repay  In  period  2  a  debt  whose  contractual  value  is  D.
Furthermore,  assume  that  the  country  always  has  the  option  to  repudiate
its  debt  and  also  assume  that  the  banks  can  (credibly)  impose  -in
retallation-  a  sanction  that  amounts  to  a  fraction  AQ of  the  country's
income.  Q.  Finally,  assume  that  the  banks  can  always  get  the  country  to
pay  'hat  fraction  AQ that  the  country  would  forego  by  defaulting.  Call
dF;  the  density  of  the  (random)  distribution  of  the  country's  income.
Let  r  be  the  riskless  rate  and  take  the  banks  to  be  risk-neutral.  One
can  write  the  market  value  of  the  debt  D as
D/AX
(1)  V(D) - 1  l  J  AQ dF(Q) +  j  D.  dF  (Q) ]
0  D/A
The  first  term  in  the  bracket  represents  how  much  the  banks  can  get
when  the  income  of  the  country  satisfies  AQ s  D.  In  that  case  indeed  the
country  would  rather  default  than  paying  the  face  value  of  the  debt  and
we  assumed  that  the  banks  can  get  the  country  to  pay  the  fraction  AQ
that  the  country  would  lose  by  doing  so.
2The  second  term  in  the  bracket  measures  the  expected  payments  that
accrue  to  the  banks  when  the  country  does  honor  the  contractual  value  of
the  debt.  This  happens  with  a  probability  1-F(D/A).
There  are  obviously  many  questions  that  such  a  model  does  not
address.  Why Is  it  that  the  debt  Is  not  a  contract  that  is  contingent  on
the  realization  of  Q  ?  Where does  the  debt  comes  from  and  why  Is  it  that
there  Is  not  a  clause  that  raises  the  face  value  D  when  -in  expected
terms-  the  country  is  insolvent  ?  What  would  happen  if  bargaining
considerations  were  introduced  in  the  second  period  ?  How  to  handle  the
incentive  questions  when  Q  is  endogeneously  determined  by  capital
accumulation  ?  These  questions  are  not  all  specific  to  the  debt
literature  (in  particular  the  uncontingent  dimension  of  the  debt).  Some
are,  such  as  the  bargaining  questions.  We  can  only,  here,  refer  to
earlier  works  such  as  the  surveys  In  Eaton,  Gersovltz  and  Stiglltz
(1986).  or  the  papers  contained  In  Dealing  With  T  Debt  Crisis  (1990)
or  to  our  own  work  (Cohen,  1991) for  an  attempt  to  answer  some  of  these
questions.
The  issue  that  we  want  to  address  here  Is  one  that  has  been  raised
by  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988)  and  Dooley  (1988)  in  a  similar  set  up  and  is
related  to  the  valuation  of  the  debt  and  Its  Implication  for  debt
buy-backs.  Consider  equation  (1).  The  market  price  of  the  debt  (such  as
observed  on  the  secondary  market)  can  simply  be  written  as
D/A
(2)  q(D) = V  =  1  [  J  dF(Q) +  -F(D/)
If  a  country  were  to  repurchase  one  dollar  of  its  debt  on  the
secondary  market,  this  is  the  price  that  it  would  have  to  pay.
Now  Dooley  (1988)  has  made  the  following  remark.  Assume  that  the
country  is  known  in  advance  to  want  to  repurchase  a  share  B of  Its  debt.
At  which  price  will  the  transaction  take  place  ?  If  lenders  act
competitiveiy  and  if  they  are  all  aware  of  the  transaction  B  that  the
country  wants  to  undertake,  they  will  oniy  accept  to  sell  at  the  price
3that  will  prevail  ex-Dost,  after  the  transaction  is  completed.  This
price  is  simply
q(D-B)  ..L. {  |  dF(Q) +  I-F  [(D-B)/AI  }
0
and  is  obviously  larger  (perhaps  much  larger)  than  the  initial  price.
This  argument  Is  aimLd  at  showing  that  it  is  not  a  good  business  to
buy-back  a  large  amount  of  debt  and  letting  the  creditors  know  it.
The  second  key  remark  is  the  one  made  by  Bulow and  Rogof.  (1988).
Even  when  it  only  performs  a  small  transaction,  the  country  has  to  pay  a
price  such  as  (2)  that  does  not  properly  measure  the  benefit  accruing  to
it  when  it  repurchases  its  debt.  Indeed,  one  dollar  repurchased  by  the
country  reduces  the  burden  of  the  repayment  by  an  amount  which  is
measured  by  the  marfzinal  (rather  than  the  average)  price  of  the  debt.
Here,  this  marginal  price  is:
p(D)  a  V'(D)  =  1 - F(D/A)
which  Is  strictly  (perhaps  much)  lower  than  q(D).
So,  even  if  the  country  could  "ride-up"  the  price-quantity  schedule
and  repurchase,  one  dollar  after  the  other,  the  quantity  B,  it  would  end
up  paying  the  reduction  of  the  market  value  of  the  debt  by  an  amount
D
f  q(D) dD  which  is  above  the  actual  reduction of  the  debt's  market
D-B
D
value  AV u  V(D) -V(D-B)  =  f  p(D)dD.
D-B
All  these  questions  are  obviously  extremely  important  in  assessing
the  key  question  of  determining  which  strategy  the  country  should
undertake  in  order  to  alleviate  -through  the  secondary  market-  the
burden  of  its  debt.
4The  model  above,  however,  is  very  qualitative  and  does  not  help
very  much  assessing  the  empirical  magnitude  of  the  effects  that  It
points  out  to.  It  is  the  purpose  of  the  following  sections  to  address
this  empirical  dimension.
III  - A VALUATION  FORMULA  FOR LDC DEBT
We  want  to  generalize  a  formula  such  (1)  so  as  to  give  It  an
dmpirical  content.  In  order  to  do  that,  we  shall  make  the  foll. wing
assumptions.  We consider  a  continuous  time  model  of  an  infinitely  lived
economy.  We  assume  that  the  resources  Qt  Of  the  country  follow  a
Brownian  process  and  we  let  Pt  X  A  Qt  represent  how  much  the  banks  can.
at  most,  oblige  the  country  to  pay.  We write  the  law  of  motion  of  Pt  as
fodlows
dP
(2)  D-  =  dt  + °  dzt  i  zt  a  Wiener process.
t
We  also  assume  that  the  debt  is  short-term  and  continuously
rescheduled  at  the  riskless  rate  of  Interest  by  the  creditors.  With  that
hypothesis,  the  banks  can  always  capture  P I(=A Qt)  as  long  as  the  debt
is  not  entirely  repaid.
The  hypothesis  that  the  debt  is  short-term  Is  somehow  farfetched,
but  not  too  much.  When  they  reschedule  the  debt  of  an  Insolvent
country,  the  banks  like  to  keep  a  short-leash  approach  so  as  to  make
sure  that  they  do  not  lose  an  opportunity  to  monitor  the  country's
choices.
The  assumption  that  the  debt  is  rescheduled  at  the  riskless  rate
may  appear  more  debatable.  Analyzing  a  fixed  spread  over  libor  would  not
be  very  Interesting  ,however,  since  the  spread  should  decline  as  the
country  becomes  solvent.  Our  assumption  is  instead  litterally  true  for
the  public  debt  that  is  negotiated  at  the  Paris  Club.  For  commercial
banks,the  spread  over  llbor  is  actually  quite  small  and  has  been
steadily  declining.  In  table  IV.4  of  the  World  Debt  Tables  (1989),  for
instance,  one  sees  that  the  spread  over  llbor  (for  the  debt
restructuring  agreements)  was  (in  percentage  points):  1.8  In  1982-85,
51.3  in  1986,  1.0  in  1987  and  0.8  in  1988.  As  these  data  show,  the  banks
may  have  responded  to  the  early  stage  of  the  debt  crisis  by  a  large
spread  that  has  helped  them  raise  the  face  value  of  their  debt  and  then
-perhaps  for  incentive  reason-  they  left  the  spread  go  down  (see  Cohen
(1989) for  a  potential  explanation  of  this  behavior).
With  these  assumptions,  one  can  write  the  law  of  motion  of  the  face
value  of  the  debt  as:
d Dt =[  r  Dt-Pt  ]  dt  as long as  Dt  °
Call  Vt  the  market  value  of  the  debt.  Assuming  rlsk-neutral
lenders,  it  is  a  solution  to
(3)  Et  dVt  + Pt  dt  =  r  Vt  dt
whenever  D  > 0.  (Et  is  the  expectation  at  time  t).
Call  qt  the  market  price  of  the  debt  so  that  Vt  =  qt  Dt  and  call
P t
x  D  the  apparent  yield  on  the  country's  debt.  We  shall  seek  a
Dt
function  q(x)  which  is  a  solution  to  (3).  Making  use  of  Ito's  lemma,  one
can  show  that  q(x)  is  a  solution  to  the  following  differential  equation:
(4)  2 q'(x)  x2 oc2  4 x  q'(x)  [gs-rexl - q(x)  x  x  e O
There  are  two  boundary  conditions.  When x  approaches  0  (the  face
value  of  the  debt  becomes  infinite),  then  the  banks  simply  get  the
present  discounted  value  of  all  Pt.  Therefore  lim  q(x)  1
t'  ~x->O x
The  other  boundary  condition  is  the  following.  When x  =  X  (the  face
value  of  the  debt  goes  to  zero)  the  country  is  solvent,  so  that
I im  q(x)  =  1 (the  debt  is  quoted  at  par).
X->se
One  can  then  check  (see  appendix  for  details)  that  the  price  q(x)  of
the  debt  can  then  be  written:
6[  (a)  q(x)  2  C(1  _ x)  I  (t)dt  when  x  < x
0~~~~~~
(5)  (b)  q(x)  =  I  - C  x  - 1) f  ((t)dt  when  x  > x
0  lx
(c)  q(xO)  1  - C e
in which
x  = r-lt
(6)  ((t)  =  -i  e 2 e  2t  tg  ;  2
C=  1
iJ  e  St  t9  dt
0
C  Is  obtained  by  imposing  that  q(x)  is  a  differentiable
function.  It  can be depicted as  in diagram  lt.
1.  I  thank  Colln  Miles  for  drawing  this  picture  out  of  a  numerical
estimate  of  equation  (5).
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0~~~~~~~~~~~On Diagram  1  the  so'id  live  qo(x)  represents  the  market  price  of
the debt  when there  Is no risk  (a=O). It  Is w rth  qo(x)  - f  when x  < xo xo
and  1  otherwise.  In  the  zero-risk  case,  the  country's  debt  is  quoted
below par  whenever the  present  discounted value of  the  transfers  paid  by
the  debtor  Is  below  the  face  value  of  the  debt.  When the  present
discounted  value  of  these  transfers  exceeds  the  face  value  of  the  debt.
then  there  will  necessarily  come  a  point  when  the  country  will  have
repaid  all  its  debt,  so that  the  price Is necessarily one all the  time.
When  the  transfers  are  risky  (r  >  0),  the  expected  present
discounted  value  of  all  Pt  Is  again  r  and  It  does  not  depend on  -.
The  difference  between  the  risky  and  the  non risky  case  is  due  to  the
fact  that  a  gMd fortune  may help the  country  repay  all  Its  debt sn  that
the  value  of  the  claim  held  by  the  debtor  is  1M  than  the  present
discounted  value  of  lal  future  transers  Pt.  (A similar  picture  emerges
in  Genotte, Kharas and Sadeq  1987).
In  the  case  when  x  =  xo,  for  instance,  present  discounted  value
calculation  (based  on  the  assumption  that  creditors  would receive Pt  for
ever)  would  lead  to  the  misleading  Implication  that  the  debt  should  be
quoted  at  par.  In  table  1,  we  have  shown  the  discount  which  Instead
appears  when  the  risk  component  is  taken  Into  account,  In  that  case
x 0
(when x  =  x )  and in the  case when x  =  2
TABLE  I  - THE  MARKET PRICE  OF  THE DEBT
l3  Case  x  - x  Case  x  - x  2
I  0. 63  0.390
2  0.73  0.444
5  0.  825  0.487
10  0.  875  0.  498
9B - 2  "  so that  a  standard  deviation a-  0.2  (which Is that  which
Is  observed  on  Wall  Street)  and  a  difference  between  interest  rate  and
growth  of  4  percentage  points  lead to  3  =  2  which we shall  take  as  our
benchmark case in the sequel.
As  a  simple  application  of  table  1,  one  may  ask:  what  is  the
equivalence,  from  the  creditors'  view  point,  between  an  increase  in  the
growth rate  of  payments and a  reduction  of current  payments?
When  the  value  of  the  debt  is  infinite,  the  equivalence  is
straightforward  to  calculate.  The  value  of  the  debt  Is  simply V  =  -O
so  that  Fd  - . If  growth  is  increased  by  I  percentage  point  then,
say  when r-,u  a  4 %, lenders  can accept a  25 7  reduction  of  the  transfers
made by the  country.  This 25 7. reduction  is obviously the  maximum amount
of  debt  service  reduction  that  lenders  can  accept  when  the  debt  Is
finite.  When the  debt  is  very  small,  for  example, the  trade-off  becomes
a  negligible one  as  the  lenders  care  less  about  the  future  growth  of  the
country's  ability  to  pay  in  the  future  (since  they  do  not  expect  to  cash
it  in full).
As  an  intermediate  case,  it  is  possible  to  use  formula  (1)  to  see
how this  trade-off  operates  when x  xo,  3 = 2  and r-.  = 0.04.  One can
calculate  In  that  case  that  an  additionnal  I  percentage  point  of  the
country's  growth  can "buy" a  15 % reduction  of  the  current  payments that
the country makes to  its  creditors.
IV - THE VALUE  OF A DEBT WRITE-OFF
1  - Let  us  first  assume  that  the  country  wants  to  repurchase  Its
debt  on the  secondary market.  As we  argued in  section  II,  if  It  makes an
offer  to  the  banks,  and  If  we  assume  that  the  banks  are  a  group  of
competitive  Investors,  the  only  price  at  which  the  transaction  can  take
place  Is  the  ex-post  market  value  of  the  debt  which  will  prevail  after
the  transaction  has  taken  place.  As  an  application  of  the  numbers
displayed  In  table  1,  consider  the  case  when  the  country's  debt  Is
initially  such  that  x  n  zx 0 and  assume  that  the  country  wants  to
repurchase  half  of  Its  debt.  Consider for  instance  the  case  when 1B  =  2
10we  see  from  table  1 that  the  debt  must  be  repurchased  at  73  cents  on  the
dollar,  despite  an  initial  price  of  45  cents  on  the  dollar  before  the
transaction  was  announced.  This  indicates  that  repurchasing  half  the
£ae viuen oL gh  debt costs  62 Z. of  its  initial  market value.
2  - Assume  now  instead  that  banks  can  rationnally  coordinate  their
collective  behavior  and that  the  country  can  make  the  banks  a  credible
"take  it  or  leave  it"  offer  such  as:  "repurchase  the  debt  at  such  price
or  I  use  the  money  in  an  alternative  way  which  yields  no  benefits  to  you
(say  I  consume  it)".  What  is  now  the  cost  -under  this  hypothesis-  of
xo
repurchasing  half  the  debt.  When x  goes  from  T-to  x 0,  the  value  of  the
banks'  claims  is  reduced  by  a  number  which  is
x
AV - q( 2 )  D  - q(x0)  D/2
This  implies  that  the  banks  must  be  compensated  for  reducing  the
debt  by  half  by  a  fraction  e of  their  initial  claim  which  is  equal  to
0 a  AV  . r l  _  I  q(x)l
q(x/2).D  2 q(x/2)  7
When  13 =  2.  we  find  that  e  18  %.  This  number  can  therefore  be
advantageously  compared  to  the  62  % which  was  found  In  the  previous
paragraph.  Under  the  hypotheses  which  have  adopted,  ihe  caDabilicy  of
maklne  j  credible  offer  to  the  banks  therefore  reDresents  as  much  as  44%
gE  She  market  value  of  the  debt.  This  shows  that  the  point  made  by
Dooley can  indeed  be  potentially  very  important.
3  - As  pointed  out  by  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988),  we  have  seen  that,
when  small  transactions  are  involved,  the  relevant  statistic  to  analyze
the  value  of  a  debt  reduction  is  the  marginal  value  of  the  debt.  Call
p  *  d  this  marginal  price.  p  measures  the  market  value  which  the  banks
as  a  whole  are  actually  giving  up  when  they  reduce  the  face  value  of  the
debt  by  one  dollar.  Mathematically  one  finds  p  =  q(x)  - xq'(x).  As  x
approaches  zero  (the  debt  becomes  very  large),  it  is  easy  to  check  that
the  ratio  of  the  marginal  to  the  average  price  of  the  debt  is  zero  (the
lenders  -as  a  whole-  do  not  care  at  all  about  one  more  or  one  less
dollar).  Conversely,  as  the  debt  goes  to  zero,  the  marginal  and  the
11average  prices  do  converge  one  towards  the  other.  In  table  2,  1  have
calculated  the  marginal  price  of  the  debt  in  the  two  corresponding  cases
which  were  desplayed  in  table  1.  We see  from  tables  I  and  2  that  the
difference  between  the  marginal  and  the  average  price  remains  very
substantial,  even  in  the  case  when  x  =  x  O.  Indeed,  In  such  cases,  the
Margjinal  pSo_e  always  a  to  be  =  than  half  the  yalue  2f  the
average  Price.  For  instance,  a  relatively  solvent  country  such  as  one
obtained  when  x  =  x0 and  03  =  10, whose  debt  only  shows  a  12.5% discount,
exhibits  a  marginal  price  of  Its  debt  of  only  42  cents  on  the  dollar.
For  a  country  with  the  same  characteristic  (g  - 10)  and  twice  bigger  a
debt,  the  marginal  price  is  virtually  zero,  while  the  discount  which  Is
observed  on  the  secondary  market  is  about  50%.
These  results  confirm  the  econometric  evidences  which  are  shown  In
Cohen  (1989)  where  it  was  indeed  found  -out  of  a  direct  analysis  of  the
data  on  the  secondary  market-  that  the  hypothesis  that  the  marginal
price  was  zero  could  not  be  statistically  rejected  when  the  debt  was
quoted  at  a  50  % discount.
(The  evidence  brought  by  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1988)  for  the  Bolivian
debt  also  strongly  pointed  to  the  fact  that  Its  marginal  price  was
zero).
TABLE 2  - MARGINAL  PRICE OF THE DErsT
(1)  x  =  x0 (2)  x  - x0 /  2
0=  1  0.266  0.148
10 = 2  0.336  0.110
0  =  5  0.388  0.017
0l .10  0.420  0.007
12V - THE VALUE  OF GUARANTEEING  THE DEBT
Offering  a  guarantee  on  the  payment  of  the  debt  usually  Involves
two  distinct  mechanisms.  One  is  to  guarantee  that,  say  the  interest  will
always  be  paid.  The  other  one  amounts  to  protect  the  lenders  from  the
stochastic  disturbances  which  afflict  the  ability  of  the  country  to
service  its  debt.  The  first  mechanism  is  generally  =  a  pure  guarantee
and  may  actually  enhance  the  average  ability  of  the  country  to  service
its  debt.  To  that  extent,  it  involves  a  partial  bail  out  of  the  banks  as
well  as  a  pure  Insurance  mechanism.  In  this  section  we  limit  our
analysis  to  the  second  mechanism  and  ask:  what  is  the  value  of
protecting  the  banks  against  the  fluctuations  of  the  countries'  ability
to  pay.  Mathematically,  this  simply  amounts  to  substitute  to  the
stochastic  streams  of  repayment  Pt  a  deterministic  pattern  Pt  =  P  U
which has the  same expected mean, and offer  the  banks Min  [  Do. r -
When  the  face  value  of  the  debt  is  infinite,  the  market  value  of
such  an  insurance  scheme  is  simply  zero.  Indeed,  the  bank  are  assumed  to
be  risk-neutral  and  they  already  expect  -in  present  value  terms-  to
receive  r  When the  debt  is  not  inflnite,  the  value  of  the  guarantee
is  simply  given  by  the  difference  between  the  market  price  of  the  debt
and  the  qo(x)  line  displayed  in  diagram  1.  From  this  diagram,  it  Is
apparent  that  the  maximum  value  of  such  a  guarantee  is  obtained  at  the
point  when  x  =  x0. At  this  point  the  country  would  be  solvent  If  the
banks  could  make  sure  to  get  P0 e  pt  rather  than  Pt.  One  also  sees  that
the  maximum  value  of  the  guarantee  is  nothing  else  but  the  market
discount  which  the  debt  would  exhibit  at  this  point.  Table  3  also  shows
xo
the  value  of  guaranteeing  the  debt  when  x  2
13TABLE 3  - THE VALUE  OF GUARANTEING  THE DEBT
AGAINST  DEBTORS' RISK
(in  % of  the  market  value  of  the  debt)
Maximum  value  Value of  the
of  such  guarantee
guarantee  when
(x=x  )  x=x 0/  2
$  1  37  7.  22  %
$=2  27  %  10  7
$  = 5  17.5  7  2.6  X
,  =10  12.5  %  1.4  7
We  therefore  see,  for  instanee,  that  the  value  (to  the  banks)  of
offsetting  the  stochastic  disturbances  of  the  debtor's  transfers
represents  (only)  approximately  10  % of  the  market  value  of  the  debt  In
the  case  when  g  =  2 and  when  the  debtor  is  "half-solvent".
VI - SOME PERSPECTIVES  ON THE MEXICAN  DEAL
In  July  1989,  Mexico  and  Its  creditors  agreed  on  a  debt  relief  plan
offering  the  banks  three  options:  1)  Reduce  the  face  value  of  the  debt
by  35  7  ;  2)  Reduce  the  interest  rate  down  to  6.25  % ;  3)  Capitalize
about  2/3  of  the  interest  due.  The  negotiated  settlement  (such  as
eventually  signed  early  1990)  involves  the  following  combination:
1)  42  7.  of  the  debt  is  swapped  against  a  bond  whose  face  value  is
written  down  by  35  % ;  2)  46  Z  of  the  debt  Is  swapped  against  a  bond
with  a  reduced  nominal  interest  rate  ;  3)  12  7  of  the  debt  will  be
rescheduled  along  the  line  of  the  third  option.  One  may  estimate  that  a
nominal  write-off  of  about  15  bls  emerged  from  the  deal  (see
Claessens  and  Van  Winjbergen,  1990).  The  market  value  of  this  nominal
14write-off  must  be  estimated  at  the  marginal  price  shown  in  table  2.
For  ,1 =  2.  we  get  the  following:
TABLE 4  - MARKET  VALUE OF THE DEBT WRITE-OFF
x  =  xx 0 x  =x 0 /  2
5.0  1.6
In exchange,  4  bls  of  new  money  (2 from  the  World Bank and  the  IMF.
2  from  the  Japanese  Government)  were  put  on  the  table  to  "encourage"  the
deal.  Let  us  interpret  those  4  bls  as  a  loan  which  is  understood  by  the
parties  to  be  junior  to  the  newly  issued  bonds.  The  value  to  the  senior
creditors  of  a  funior  claim  is  simply  measured  by  its  face  value  minus
Its  marginal  price  (which  corresponds  to  the  case  when  the  junior  money
is  indeed  cashed  in  back  by  the  junior  creditors).  It  is  reported  in
table  5.  Depending  upon  which  interpretation  we  have  of  the  Mexican
situation  we  can  come  up  with  the  two  following  numbers  (taking  the  case
13=2  as  a  benchmark).
TABLE 5  - MARKET  VALUE  TO SENIOR CREDITORS
OF 4  bls  OF "NEW" JUNIOR MONEY
x  =  x0 x=  x0 /  2
2.7  3.6
Compared  to  table  4,  one  sees  that  it  is  a  bad  or  a  good  deal  for
the  banks  depending  upon  whether  x  =  x0 or  x  =  x0 /  2.  If  one  takes  the
observed  market  price  (of  about  45  cents)  to  be  an  accurate  measure  of
Mexico's  solvency,  one  should  conclude  (from  table  1)  that  the
hypothesis  that  x  =  x2 /  2  Is  the  correct  one.  1'  that  case,  the  banks
isgave  up 1.6 bls  (in  market  terms),  while the  sponsors put  3.6  bls  on the
table.
16APPENDIX
Let  us  show  how  to  get  the  solution  to  equation  (4).  Call
z(x)  =  q(x)-l.  Equation  (4)  can  then  be  written
12 (Al) ; o2  z"(x)  x.+z'(x)  1  -r.+xI- z(x)=O
When x  0  xo,  define  the  auxilliary  function  F(x)  as  the  solution  to:
(A2) z(x)  - (x  +  . - r)  F(x)
F(x)  is  a  solution  to  the  following  differential  equation
(A3)  x(x  +  - r) 02  F"(x)  + F'(x)  [x o2  + (x +  A - r)2]  O
That  is
F"(x)  f  2  2  x  +  L  - r
F'(x)  lx+,-r  x  J
Integrating  (A4) yields:
Log  F'(x)  =  -2  Log  (x  + p  - r)  22  x  + 2  r  Log  x  +  C
So that  one  can  write
(AS)  F'(x)  - C
in  which  1B  and  x0 are  defined  as  in  equation  (6).
17Using  the  two  boundary  conditions,  one  can  then  show  that
x/xO
(A6) x  c  xO => q(x)  =  xX  - C_ (I  --  |  p(t)  dt
0  ~~~00
(A7)  y  > x  => q(x)  -1  - C  (x  ^1)  |  (t)  dt
X/x0
Integrating  p  by  part  shows  that
X/0  1  X/  (  )  Xx0
(A8) x  < x 0 => f  (t)dt=-  X/x_ -Ie  (  x  )  J  ti e $dt
000  0
and  similarly  that
(A9) x  > x  => J  v(t)dt  =  1  e  J  t-1  e-Jdt.
x/Yb  X/x 0
One can  readily  see  that  the  continuity  of  q(x)  (imposed  by  the
no-arbitrage  condition)  yields  C_=  C+e  C  and  that  q  (x0 )  Is  as  In
equation  (S.  c).  In  order  to  find  C,  we  Impose  that  q(x)  is
differentiable  (hence  twice  differentiable  since  we  want  q  to  be  a
solution  to  a  differential  equation  of  order  2).
From  (A6),  one  can  write:
1  C  lX/X  (  X  x
o  x  0  x0  (ia)x
and,out  of  equation  1A8). we  caiz then  write
x  <  xO => q (x)  =  O  aO fx  J  t-'  e-t  dt
0  :~O  0o
0Similarly, one would get from  equation (A7)
i~~~~~~~~~  x0
xx x-
Writing that  q'(x) - q'(x0 +) consequently imposes that
1
@ J  t9l 1 e flt  dt
0
Integration  t  1 eat  by  part  shows that  C  Is  Indeed as  In  equation
(6).
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